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Methods of Studying False Memory 
The study of memory is one of those domains in psychology which has clear practical 
relevance. Think, for example, about people with Alzheimer’s disease. Devastating 
dysfunction experienced by these patients makes it abundantly evident that our memory 
constitutes an overarching and critical role in our daily life. However, in the study of memory, 
there is another memory phenomenon that also carries with it enormous theoretical and 
practical implications, namely, memory illusions. That is, people frequently claim that they 
remember details or even an entire event that never actually happened. These false memories 
can have serious consequences when they appear in the testimony of witness, victims, or 
suspects in legal cases (Howe & Knott, 2015; Otgaar, De Ruiter, Howe, Hoetmer, & van 
Reekum, in press). A person, for example, might falsely remember that he/she was sexually 
abused when he/she was a child, and this memory illusion might lead to false accusations that 
may result in wrongful convictions.   
Because of the legal implications that such false memories might have, a plethora of 
studies have been devoted to investigating the creation and factors underlying the persistence 
of false memories. Across these studies, there exists a wide variety of methods that have been 
used to experimentally induce false memories in the laboratory, ranging from methods with 
strict experimental control to methods that mimic situations occurring in clinical and legal 
practices. In the current chapter, we provide a synopsis of different false memory procedures 
that memory researchers have used to study the phenomenon of false memories. We will also 
show that although some of these procedures were designed to promote the formation of false 
memory, recent insights have taught us that at least for some of them, what is created is false 
belief1 rather than false memory. Before elaborating on these diverse false memory 
                                                
1 Belief has been defined as the attribution that an experience truly occurred to the self in the past (e.g., Otgaar, 
Scoboria, & Mazzoni, 2014) 
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procedures, we first describe the impetus that started experimental work into the phenomenon 
of memory illusions.  
False Memory in the Courtroom 
 In the 1990s, a heated debate took place concerning the validity of repressed and 
recovered memories of childhood sexual abuse (Lindsay & Read, 1994; Loftus, 1993). These 
traumatic memories were oftentimes recovered in psychotherapy. At that time, mental health 
professionals asserted that these memories were repressed at the time of the trauma (i.e., 
patients had no access to these memories) and were only discovered during therapeutic 
sessions where the patient felt “safe” and therefore, could recover these painful experiences. 
On the other side, memory researchers argued that many of the techniques used in 
psychotherapy were inherently suggestive, and that it was the use of these techniques that 
may have caused patients to falsely remember episodes of sexual abuse. This discussion has 
led to the so-called “Memory Wars” which was one of the fiercest debates ever in 
psychological science (Loftus & Davis, 2006). Besides the controversial claim that memory 
repression actually exists, this debate became even more vicious because of the increasing 
number of legal cases in which it was shown that people were wrongly convicted on the basis 
of false memories that were elicited during suggestive therapy. Many accusers later retracted 
their claims because they realized that their testimony was the result of the enduring 
suggestive power of therapeutic techniques, such as dream interpretation and recovered 
memory therapy (Maran, 2010). Because of the possible involvement of false memories in 
these legal cases, memory researchers displayed increased scientific interest in methods to 
induce false memories.  
 The majority of these recovered memory cases was based on adults claiming that they 
had been abused during childhood (see Howe, 2013). However, earlier in the 1980s, an 
outburst of legal cases across North America and Europe were filed with children as the 
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victims. The recurring theme in these so-called daycare abuse cases was that a large group of 
children reported having been traumatized by the same person(s) at an elementary school or 
daycare center (Garven, Wood, Malpass, & Shaw, 1998; Otgaar et al., in press). In many of 
these cases, children were interviewed by social workers, police, and parents in suggestive 
ways, which might have adversely affected their statements by creating false memories. Like 
the examples mentioned with the cases involving adults, here too, memory scholars became 
interested in studying the development of children’s false memories. To this end, during the 
past decades, several procedures have been constructed to study how false memories are 
formed in an experimentally controlled manner.  
The Elicitation of False Memory 
Myriad methods have been designed in the past years to examine the formation of 
false memories. All paradigms differ in a number of ways such that some use simple word 
lists as stimuli whereas others employ more complex realistic stimuli such as videos or staged 
events. Furthermore, some of these methods tap into basic forms of memories such as 
semantic memories, whereas others are focused more on ecologically valid procedures to 
foster autobiographical false memories. Besides these differences, there are several points of 
similarity among the diverse set of false memory methods (see Table 1). Although perhaps 
there are other categorizations of similarity, our idea was to classify different false memory 
methods based on how these false memories could be formed in real life (e.g., in a police 
interviewing setting). For example, it has been shown that in a number of legal cases, 
suggestive pressure during an interview resulted in false memories.  Based on these cases, 
false memory methods have been constructed that use some form of suggestion. We begin by 
describing methods used to study these suggestion-induced false memories and then turn to a 
description of spontaneous false memories. 
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Suggestion-induced False Memories 
Misinformation Method  
One of the most popular and well-studied methods to evoke false memories is the 
misinformation method (Loftus, 2005).  The misinformation method follows a three-phase 
procedure. In the first phase, participants are presented with stimuli such as pictures or a 
video about, for example, a theft. An alternative to such passive viewing is that participants 
are involved in a staged event, such as a thief stealing a laptop during a class presentation 
(Otgaar, Candel, Smeets, & Merckelbach, 2010). Following this, participants are presented 
with misinformation in the form of narrative or suggestive questions. During this 
misinformation phase, participants are exposed to misleading information (e.g., asking what 
weapon the culprit was carrying during the theft even though there was no weapon present). 
In the final stage, participants receive a memory test in which they are asked what they can 
remember about the presented stimuli. The important finding here is that a significant 
minority of participants fall prey to the misinformation and incorporate it in their memory 
reports. This result is known as the misinformation effect. 
One of the pioneering studies using this false memory method was performed by 
Loftus, Miller, and Burns (1978). In their study, participants were presented with a series of 
slides depicting a car-pedestrian accident. About half of the participants received a slide in 
which a red Datsun stopped at a stop sign while the other participants saw a slide in which the 
car stopped at a yield sign (Experiment 1). After this, participants received a questionnaire in 
which half of the participants were asked the question: “Did another car pass the red Datsun 
while it was stopped at the stop sign?” For the other half of the participants, the word “stop 
sign” was replaced with “yield sign.” In this way, half of the participants received information 
that was actually seen whereas others received misinformation. Following this, participants 
engaged in a forced-choice visual recognition test in which they received pairs of slides and 
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were asked to indicate which slide they saw during the original encoding phase. The critical 
finding was that more than half of the participants incorrectly remembered the wrong slide 
thereby demonstrating a misinformation effect.  
After this study, a multitude of studies have been devoted to replicating this effect. 
Furthermore, these studies have examined the circumstances under which this effect can be 
enhanced or reduced. One vital question pertaining to this effect is whether the time interval 
between the presentation of misinformation and the final memory test would affect the 
misinformation effect. The standard finding here is that when the interval increases, so too 
does the size of the misinformation effect (Higham, 1998).  Another important issue is 
whether the misinformation effect can be reduced when warnings are provided after the 
exposure to misinformation. A recent meta-analysis showed that although the misinformation 
effect is unlikely to be completely abolished, providing warnings is effective in reducing the 
extent of the misinformation effect (Blank & Launay, 2014). Specifically, based on this meta-
analysis, it can be concluded that on average warnings can reduce the misinformation effect to 
less than half of its size.  
An especially practically relevant question is whether the misinformation effect exists 
in populations other than adults, such as children.  Research that has implemented the 
misinformation method with children has tended to focus on children’s susceptibility to 
suggestive questioning when the suggestion is repeated or when a person of authority delivers 
the suggestion. Also, in many of the misinformation studies using children, children are 
involved in (staged) events after which they receive suggestive information. For example, in 
one study, 5-year-old children received a vaccination from a paediatrician (Bruck, Ceci, 
Francoeur, & Barr, 1995). Children were repeatedly interviewed about this event one year 
later. One group of children who were interviewed in a neutral, non-suggestive manner 
provided accurate reports of the visit. However, the group of children who were interviewed 
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suggestively using misinformation often falsely recollected certain details (e.g., a female 
researcher inoculated them instead of the male paediatrician).  
The effect of suggestion on children’s memory can also be subtler. In a study 
conducted by Poole and Lindsay (1995), 3- to 4-year-olds and 5- to 7-year-olds interacted 
individually with Mr. Science; an adult who demonstrated certain “science facts” to children. 
After a three month interval, parents suggested to some of the children details that did not 
take place during the Mr. Science event (e.g., “Mr. Science putting something yucky in their 
mouth”). The authors found that many children incorrectly remembered details that were 
suggested by their parents even though these details were not a part of the original event.  
Even more relevant for legal purposes is the finding that misinformation effects can be 
stronger in younger children than in older children and adults. For example, Otgaar and 
colleagues (2010) instructed 4-year old and 9-year old children to remove three pieces of 
clothing from a puppet. Half of the children were provided with fake information suggesting 
that they removed four pieces of clothing. In three interviews separated by 1-week intervals, 
children were asked to indicate which pieces of clothing they took off from the puppet. False 
memory effects were higher in younger than older children. Sutherland and Hayne (2001) 
compared children’s misinformation effects with those of adults’ and found that children were 
more susceptible to forming false memories based on misinformation than adults. In sum, 
these studies show that there is an age-related decrease in the susceptibility to misinformation 
effects (but see Otgaar, Howe, Brackmann, & Smeets, 2016 for a reversal of this 
developmental pattern).  
Implantation Method  
An extension of the misinformation method is the false memory implantation method 
in which entire fictitious events are inserted into memory (Frenda, Nichols, & Loftus, 2011; 
Otgaar & Candel, 2011). This method has high practical relevance because it focuses on the 
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creation of implanted false memories that have oftentimes figured prominently in child sexual 
abuse cases. The basic procedure of this method goes as follows. First, researchers contact the 
parents (or relatives) of a potential participant and ask whether their child has ever 
experienced a certain event (e.g., lost in a shopping mall). If not, researchers will interview 
the participant and ask him/her about experienced events as well as the fabricated event. 
Specifically, researchers suggest to the participant that he/she has experienced these events 
during childhood because their parents had already informed the researchers about these 
events. During multiple interviews, the participant attempts to recall everything he/she can 
remember about these events. The chief finding here is that about 30% of participants are 
vulnerable to these suggestions and falsely remember that the nonexperienced event happened 
to them in their childhood (Scoboria, Wade, Lindsay, Azad, Strange, Ost, & Hyman, 2017).  
Loftus and Pickrell (1995) were the first to show the tainting impact of personalized 
suggestions on memory. In their study, adult participants were suggestively interviewed that 
they were lost in a shopping mall when they were five years old. Participants were asked 
about this false event during two suggestive interviews. A quarter of participants (n = 6) 
created implanted false memories for the suggested event and even provided additional event-
related details. Hyman, Husband, and Billings (1995) were also one of the first to examine the 
creation of implanted false memories. They suggested a positive (clown at a birthday party) or 
a negative event (overnight hospitalization for fever and ear infection) to participants and 
found that at the second interview, 20% (n = 4) of participants falsely remembered the 
suggested event.  
The false memory implantation method has a number of different variants that have 
been used to foster implanted false memories. For example, Wade, Garry, Read, and Lindsay 
(2002) provided adult participants with fake photographs depicting them being on a hot air 
balloon ride and suggested to the participants that they were on a hot air balloon ride during 
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their childhood. False memory implantation studies have also been conducted using children 
as participants.  For example, Ceci, Huffman, Smith, and Loftus (1994) provided preschool 
children (3- to 6-year-olds) fictitious events suggesting that their hands had been stuck in a 
mousetrap or that they experienced a hot air balloon ride. Children were asked to try to 
recollect the events on numerous occasions. About a third of the children were confident that 
the fabricated stories truly happened to them. Similar results were obtained when a suggestion 
was made that children had fallen off a tricycle and had to receive stitches in their leg (Ceci, 
Loftus, Leichtmann, & Bruck, 1994). These results demonstrate that children are highly 
susceptible to the formation of implanted false memories, and that they can falsely assent to 
both negative (e.g., mousetrap) and positive (e.g., hot air balloon ride) events (Ceci, Huffman, 
et al., 1994; Ceci, Loftus, et al., 1994). 
After these initial studies, researchers have focused on the factors that are responsible 
for these implanted false memories in children and adults. One factor that attracted 
considerable empirical attention was the effect of event plausibility. One of the first studies 
that examined the effect of plausibility on the formation of implanted false memories in adults 
was conducted by Pezdek, Finger, and Hodge (1997). In two experiments, they manipulated 
the degree of plausibility and investigated its influence on whether participants succumbed to 
suggestive pressure. Specifically, in Experiment 1, Jewish and Catholic students were 
presented with three true and two false descriptions of (non)-experienced events. The false 
events referred to religious rituals; one specific to the Jewish community (Shabbot) and the 
other specific to the Catholic community (Communion). It was found that Jewish students 
were more likely to falsely remember the ritual that was considered plausible for them 
(Shabbot) whereas the reverse was true for the Catholic students.  
In Pezdek et al’s (1997) second experiment, adult participants listened to two false 
stories with one story representing a plausible event (i.e., lost in a shopping mall) and the 
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other representing an implausible event (i.e., receiving a rectal enema). Like the first 
experiment, the plausible event gave rise to statistically more false memories compared to the 
implausible event. Pezdek and Hodge (1999) replicated the second experiment with 5- to 7-
year-old and 9- to 12-year-old children. The pattern of findings was nearly identical. The 
authors again found that plausible events were more easily implanted in children’s memory 
than implausible events.  
However, more recent studies have not replicated this effect of plausibility on 
children’s false memory formation. In one study, younger (7/8-year-olds) and older (11/12-
year-olds) children were told that when they were four years old, they were abducted by a 
UFO or almost choked on a candy (Otgaar, Candel, Merckelbach, & Wade, 2009). 
Importantly, half of the children received false newspaper articles alleging that UFO 
abduction or choking incidents were quite frequent at the place where they lived when they 
were four years old. During two interviews, we assessed children’s vulnerability to producing 
false memories for these events. Interestingly, we found that at the second interview, children 
were more likely to falsely recall that they were abducted by a flying saucer when they 
received the fake newspaper article relative to children who did not receive the article. 
Furthermore, we also showed that children were equally likely to form false memories for the 
plausible (choked on a candy) and implausible (abducted by a UFO) events. The core 
message of these studies is that although plausible events are quite likely to be 
misremembered, even implausible events can be falsely implanted in memory. Furthermore, 
these experiments reveal that under certain conditions, plausibility does not fuel false memory 
tendencies and that both children and adults are equally likely to produce plausible and 
implausible false memories (see also Strange, Sutherland, & Garry, 2006, for similar 
findings).  
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Findings have also revealed that negative false events are more likely to engender 
false memories than neutral false events. In one of our false memory implantation studies, 7-
year-old children were presented with false narratives that they copied their neighbour’s 
homework or had to move to another classroom (Otgaar, Candel, & Merkelbach, 2008). At 
both interviews, our results indicated that children were more likely to falsely recall the 
negative than the neutral event. Subsequently, studies using suggestion-based false memory 
paradigms or other paradigms have shown similar findings in children as well in adults (e.g., 
Howe, Candel, Otgaar, Malone, & Wimmer, 2010; Porter, ten Brinke, Riley, & Baker, 2014).  
Finally, script knowledge about a false event plays a vital role in the production of 
implanted false memories. We presented younger (7-year-olds) and older (11-year-olds) 
children with false narratives describing either a high-knowledge event (i.e., finger being 
caught in a mousetrap) or low-knowledge event (i.e., receiving a rectal enema) that ostensibly 
happened when they were four years old (Otgaar, Candel, Scoboria, & Merckelbach, 2010). 
During two interviews, they were suggestively questioned about what they could recall about 
the events. We showed that at both interviews, more false memories were implanted for the 
high-knowledge event than for the low-knowledge event. Our results also demonstrated that 
younger children were more likely to adopt the suggestion than older children, a finding that 
aligns well with developmental false memory research (Ceci & Bruck, 1993).  
However, although our results indicated that script knowledge might facilitate false 
memory production, these results merely illuminated the role of existing knowledge on false 
memory creation. In many legal cases, children receive additional knowledge about false 
events because interviewers often assume that these events were experienced by these 
children (Garven, Wood, & Malpass, 2000). For example, interviewers might suggest false 
information about details concerning sexual abuse, details that might not be clear to children. 
To investigate this issue empirically, we provided 7- to 9-year-olds with extra information 
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about a fabricated event and assessed its impact on false memory propensity. Specifically, 
children were falsely told that they had visited a burn center when they were four years old 
(Otgaar, Smeets, & Peters, 2012).  Two-thirds of the children were shown a video about what 
normally happens during such an event. This manipulation served to foster knowledge about 
the event. Half of these children had to view this material every day for a week. Notably, at 
the second interview which occurred one week later, children who received extra information 
about the event were more prone to report that they had visited a burn center than the control 
group who did not receive this additional information.  
False Feedback 
 Memories can exert consequences on our behaviour. For example, victims of abuse 
often file an official complaint to the police because they have a vivid memory of being 
mistreated. This touches upon an intriguing question about whether such behavioural 
consequences might also occur for false memories. Recently, memory researchers have 
become interested in the functional value of false memories.  In particular, they have become 
intrigued by the possibility that false memories might lead to certain positive consequences 
(e.g., Howe, 2011; Otgaar et al., 2015). An interesting method that uses suggestion to study 
this is the false feedback method (Bernstein & Loftus, 2009). In the first study of this kind, 
participants were led to believe that as a child they got sick of eating a particular food 
(Bernstein, Laney, Morris, & Loftus, 2005). In the study, participants completed several 
questionnaires including a Food History Inventory. After 1 week, they were told that using a 
computer, the researcher could generate a profile of their childhood experiences with food. 
Furthermore, some participants were informed that they got sick from eating a certain food 
(e.g., hard-boiled eggs) even though this event is not true. Following this, participants 
received the Food History Inventory again. The interesting result was that when participants 
received false feedback and became convinced that they actually experienced the event, they 
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reported lower preference for and willingness to eat the particular food. This result has been 
replicated including situations in which actual eating behaviour was also affected (e.g., 
Scoboria, Mazzoni, & Jarry, 2008).  
Memory Conformity/Social Contagion  
In the above-mentioned false memory methods, suggestion was frequently provided 
by researchers or persons with authority. However, what often happens is that eyewitnesses 
talk to each other and influence each other’s memory by discussing false details. A well-
known example of this is the case of the assassination of the Swedish Foreign Minister, Anna 
Lindh.  On 10 September 2003, she was attacked and stabbed to death at a department store in 
Stockholm. Many people witnessed the attack, and many of them were brought together in a 
room soon after the attack. As they were sitting in the room, they started to discuss what 
happened during the attack. Subsequently, they were interviewed by the police, and some of 
them reported details that they heard from other eyewitnesses. Based on the account provided 
by these eyewitnesses, the police focused their search on a man wearing a military jacket with 
a camouflage pattern even though actually the culprit was wearing a grey sweater. This wrong 
detail was the result of the contaminating influence of eyewitnesses talking to each other. The 
phenomenon that eyewitnesses are influenced by what other people say is called memory 
conformity or social contagion of memory (Wright, Memon, Skagerberg, & Gabbert, 2009).  
In general, there are three ways to examine memory conformity effects. One method is 
that pairs of participants are presented with a large number of stimuli (e.g., pictures) and then 
later their memory for these stimuli is tested. In this method, one participant responds first 
followed by the other participant. The crucial question here is whether the response of the first 
participant would influence the response of the second participants. In another method, 
participants in a group are presented with several stimuli (e.g., pictures of an accident). Then, 
they engage in a discussion with other participants some of whom may be confederates of the 
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experimenter. During this discussion, several misleading items are interspersed with actual 
items. The main finding from these studies is that participants often accept these misleading 
items that were provided by their fellow participants. In the last method, participants are 
presented with information that other co-participants have said; for example, they might be 
told that 90% of the other participants believed the perpetrator was tall.  
Gabbert, Memon, and Allan (2003) showed different videos of the same event to pairs 
of participants but these participants were led to believe that they were watching the same 
video. Participants were then asked to recall the contents of the video either alone or in dyads. 
Next, participants were asked to recall again but did so individually. The basic finding was 
that a significant number of participants who first discussed the video with a co-witness 
incorporated the details they obtained during that initial discussion in their memory reports 
(see also Wright, Self, & Justice, 2000). This effect has since been replicated using various 
manipulations and populations. For example, recent research shows that children are also 
susceptible to memory conformity effects (e.g., Candel, Memon, & Al-Harazi, 2007; Otgaar, 
Howe, Brackmann, & van Helvoort, in press).   
 Although studies on memory conformity suggest that eyewitness discussion might be 
harmful for accuracy of memory, this is not necessarily the case. In a recent study, it was 
found that in certain circumstances, such discussions might actually improve accuracy as 
measured by total amount of correct recall (Vredeveldt, Groen, Ampt, & van Koppen, 2016). 
That is, when pairs of participants adopted certain retrieval strategies during the discussion, 
such as repetitions or elaborations, memory performance was not hampered but facilitated. 
Crashing Memory  
The crux of crashing memory method is to assess whether participants can be 
manipulated into stating that they saw non-existing footage of a traumatic event, particularly 
plane and car crashes. The interesting finding here is that this is indeed possible, indicating 
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that even traumatic events that are well retained can become distorted. For example, 
Crombag, Wagenaar, and van Koppen (1996) asked a group of participants questions about 
the El-Al airplane crash that happened in 1992 in Amsterdam. In this air accident, an airplane 
crashed into an 11-storey apartment building. The participants were asked whether they had 
seen “the television film of the moment the plane hit the apartment building.” (p. 99). 
Crucially, no television film existed of this crash. The authors found that 55% (n = 107) of the 
respondents said that they did see this footage (Experiment 1). In their second experiment, 
they replicated their main result and even found that 66% (n = 61) of their sample confirmed 
that they saw live footage of the plane crash. Furthermore, some participants erroneously 
“remembered” certain specific details of the non-existent live footage such as remembering 
that the plane hit the building horizontally.  
Other studies have replicated this finding. For example, Ost, Granhag, Udell, and 
Roos af Hjelmsäter (2008) found that participants stated having seen non-existant footage of 
the terrorist attacks in London in 2005. Furthermore, this effect was stronger among 
participants in UK than in Sweden. In another study, Sjoden, Granhag, Ost, and Roos af 
Hjelmsäter (2009) showed that participants confirmed having viewed non-existing footage of 
the attack on the Swedish foreign minister Anna Lindh in 2003. Taken together, the results 
are in line with the misinformation effect, indicating that post-event misleading information 
can distort people’s memory. However, the unique feature of this method is that this can 
occur for the entire traumatic incident.  
Rumor Mongering  
Remembering is frequently regarded as social in nature. That is, by remembering, 
people engage in conversations with each other and this might facilitate social relationships. 
In legal cases, when such conversations contain incorrect details, false memories might be 
created as demonstrated by the memory conformity paradigm. Another source of socially 
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created false memories is rumors which might be spread particularly in legal cases dealing 
with child sexual abuse. Indeed, in legal cases such as the McMartin preschool case, children 
reported false memories of sexual abuse not only because of suggestive interviewing but also 
because of rumors about sexual abuse that was allegedly rampant at that school at that time. 
In other words, these rumors could have contaminated children’s memory as well (Garven et 
al., 1998, 2000; Otgaar, De Ruiter, et al., in press).    
An experimental analogue of the effects of such rumors on children’s false memory 
was investigated by Principe and colleagues (2002, 2006). In their studies, four groups of 3- 
to 5-year-old children witnessed a magic show (Principe, Kanaya, Ceci, & Singh, 2006). 
During the magic show, a magician attempted to pull a live rabbit out of his hat but failed. Of 
most interest were the following two groups of children: one group of children overheard a 
conversation suggesting that the trick failed because the rabbit got loose in the school; another 
group of children did not hear this conversation but they were classmates of the other group. 
The interesting finding was that two weeks later, both groups of children incorrectly reported 
that the rabbit got loose in the school, and the majority of these children made these incorrect 
reports after receiving open-ended questions. Furthermore, many of these children also 
claimed to have seen the loose rabbit. This shows that spreading false rumors can generate 
false reports as well as false memories in children.  
Forced Confabulation  
The methods discussed so far have mainly been focused on presenting participants 
with external misinformation and then assessing the impact of this on memory. However, in 
legal cases, witnesses or victims are sometimes pressured to provide details they do not 
recollect or never experienced. Such confabulations might lead to autosuggestive effects 
which might affect memory as well. Ackil and Zaragoza (1998) described a child sexual 
abuse case (the Wenatchee, Washington child sex ring case) in which the conviction of 19 
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adults was called into question because one important witness retracted her statement saying 
that she was forced to confabulate allegations of abuse. To address the issue of whether forced 
confabulations might lead to false reports, Ackil and Zaragoza developed the forced 
confabulation method.  
In this method, children and adults are presented with, for example, a video, and are 
asked to answer questions about the details that were not actually a part of the video. For 
example, participants are asked the question “What did the boy say Sullivan had stolen?”. 
However, in the video, nothing was stolen by Sullivan, and Sullivan was not accused of theft. 
Participants are then led to confabulate a response to these false detail questions. One week 
later, participants receive a source memory test in which they are asked to answer whether 
they spoke about certain details the week before and whether they had seen these details in the 
video. The interesting finding is that participants often claim to remember seeing their 
previously mentioned forced confabulations.  
Subsequent research has replicated this finding (e.g., Otgaar, Howe, Memon, & Wang, 
2014) and extended it with various manipulations. For example, the original study focused on 
the effect of forced confabulation on false memory details. Building on this finding, Chrobak 
and Zaragoza (2008) examined whether forced confabulation of an entire fictitious event 
would lead to false memories of the event. Participants first looked at a video and then were 
forced to confabulate entire scenes that were not in the video. Although such false memory 
development was sparse after one week, after eight weeks, participants freely claimed to 
recollect their forced confabulations of the entire fabricated event. In addition, research has 
shown that the impact of forced confabulations on false memory production is increased when 
participants are told that their forced confabulations are indeed true (Zaragoza, Payment, 
Ackil, Drivdahl, & Beck, 2001).  
Imagination Inflation  
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Imagination plays a vital part in remembering. Furthermore, the act of imagining 
occurs frequently in the real-world. For example, in certain forms of psychological treatment, 
therapists may request their clients to imagine a sexually abusive experience as a means to 
uncover so-called repressed memories. Furthermore, law enforcement agencies sometimes 
instruct suspects to imagine a criminal act in order to achieve a confession (Ofshe, 1992). 
Memory researchers have devised several ways to examine the effects of imagination on 
memory. 
Garry, Manning, Loftus, and Sherman (1996) conducted one of the first studies on this 
topic. In their study, participants were involved in two sessions. In the first session, they were 
asked to complete the Life Events Inventory (LEI) which contains 40-items about how 
confident they were that some events happened to them before the age of 10 (e.g., “Broke a 
window with your hand”). Two weeks later, participants were instructed to imagine four 
critical events and were then asked to fill out the LEI once more. What the researchers found 
was that participants became more confident that the critical events happened to them even 
though they initially rated these events as unlikely to have happened. They termed this effect 
imagination inflation.  
This effect has also been assessed by using different stimuli. For example, Goff and 
Roediger (1998) examined whether repeated imaginings can lead to false memories of having 
performed a certain action. In their study, participants heard simple actions statements such as 
“break the toothpick.” For some actions, they actually performed the actions whereas for 
others they simply imagined performing the actions. In a second session, participants were 
instructed to imagine performing the actions that were mentioned in the first session as well 
as new actions. During the final test session, participants indicated whether an action occurred 
in the first session and whether they had to perform, imagine, or heard it. The chief finding 
was that the repeated imaginations led to participants falsely remembering that they 
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performed actions when in fact, they did not. This effect has since been replicated (e.g., 
Otgaar, Scoboria, Howe, Moldoveanu, & Smeets, 2016). It is important to stress that the 
imagination inflation method does not use explicit suggestive pressure to promote the 
formation of false memories. However, the finding that imagination can by itself lead to the 
creation of false memories indicates that imagining has likely played a vital role in the 
creation of false memories during psychotherapy.  
Spontaneous False Memories 
Apart from methods that have been constructed to study suggestion-induced false 
memories, methods also exist that promote the production of spontaneous false memories. 
This latter type of false memory has received much empirical attention. There are several 
reasons for this. One reason is that whereas suggestion-based false memories can be caused 
by a combination of memory mechanisms and social factors, spontaneous false memories are 
purely the result of memory mechanisms such as spreading activation (e.g., Howe, Wimmer, 
Gagnon, & Plumpton, 2009; Otgaar et al., 2016). Consequently, the production of 
spontaneous false memories provides us with a better and more complete understanding of the 
underlying factors that lead to false memory production. Second, in legal cases, eyewitnesses 
and victims oftentimes spontaneously come up with a false account of an event without 
having received any suggestive questions before that statement. A relevant question here is to 
what extent memory errors would spontaneously slip into these accounts without any external 
prompting.  
Deese/Roediger-McDermott Paradigm 
Probably the most popular way to induce spontaneous false memories is the 
Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) method, which was originally developed by Deese 
(1959) and reinvented by Roediger and McDermott (1995). The basic procedure is as follows. 
Participants are presented with several word lists. The lists can contain 12 to 15 words that are 
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associatively related to each other (e.g., tiger, circus, jungle, tamer, den, cub) as well as to a 
non-presented word called the critical lure (e.g., lion). After the encoding phase, participants 
are asked to recall or recognize the words on the list that was presented earlier. A robust and 
reliable finding is that many participants claim to remember the critical lure that was not a 
part of the original list, and that the rate of false remembering is indistinguishable from the 
rate of true remembering. The method is popular because the DRM false memory illusion is 
quite resistant to forewarnings and correlates with false autobiographical memories (e.g., 
Gallo, 2010).  
Another recent line of research has been dedicated to the examination of 
developmental trends in the DRM false memory illusion. What this research has shown is a 
counterintuitive finding that in contrast to suggestion-induced false memories, the DRM false 
memory illusion is higher among adults than in children, a phenomenon that can be described 
as a developmental reversal (Brainerd, Reyna, & Ceci, 2008; Otgaar et al., 2016).   This 
finding has strong legal implications because in court, the default assumption is that children 
are inferior witnesses because of their high susceptibility to false memories. However, this 
line of research shows that the story about this is much more complex, and that when no 
suggestion in involved, adults can be more susceptible to producing false memories than 
children.  
Visual and Video Scenes  
Recent research has also used more complex and realistic stimuli to promote 
spontaneous false memory production. That is, researchers have used visual scenes and videos 
that contain details that are related to each other but also related to non-presented items. For 
example, Moritz, Woodward, and Rodriguez-Racke (2006) presented participants visual 
scenes to examine memory deficits in schizophrenic patients. They constructed simple 
drawings of scenes (e.g., a beach) in which several related elements were left out (e.g., a 
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beach ball, bath towel; see also Miller & Gazzinga, 1998). Although such a method can be 
seen as a visual analogue of the DRM procedure, this is not completely accurate. In the DRM 
method, the degree of association among list items and the critical lure is known precisely and 
is expressed in terms of backward associative strength (BAS). However, this value is 
unknown when using the visual scene method (because no one has ever normed these 
stimuli).  
In addition to using visual scenes, videos have also been used to generate spontaneous 
false memories. For example, Peters, Hauschildt, Moritz, and Jelinek (2013) presented 
schizophrenic patients with several video sequences (e.g., police surveillance). Then, during a 
recognition test, several related but non-presented items (e.g., a weapon) were presented as 
well. In general, studies using visual or video material have shown that it leads to reliable 
rates of false memory in various populations (see Otgaar, Howe, Peters, Sauerland, & 
Raymaekers, 2013). Of further interest is recent work showing that when such material 
(videos and visual scenes) is used, children are more vulnerable to the formation of 
spontaneous false memories than adults, a finding that runs counter to the developmental 
reversal effect mentioned earlier. The theoretical explanation for this finding is that videos or 
visual scenes would make it easy for children to identify the underlying theme. As a 
consequence, children begin to make incorrect associations related to the theme, sometimes 
resulting in even higher false memory rates than adults (Otgaar, Howe, Peters, Smeets, & 
Moritz, 2014). 
False Beliefs versus False Memories 
The distinction between believing and recollecting an event has recently received 
increasing empirical interest (Otgaar, Scoboria, & Mazzoni, 2014). The reason for this is 
because previous research has often unintentionally conflated these two concepts.  
Specifically, the majority of memory research has focused mainly on believed memories 
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(Scoboria et al., 2017). However, for some experiences, no recollection exists and there is 
merely a belief in the occurrence for those experiences. A good example is our own birth. 
Obviously, we do not have a recollection of this event, but we do believe that the event had 
occurred in the past. Many methods that we have just described were intended as methods to 
induce false memories. However, recent studies have shown that many of the just-mentioned 
methods are more likely to generate false beliefs rather than memories.  
Two examples are the crashing memory and imagination inflation methods. Recent 
studies have confirmed that these methods are more likely to lead to increases in belief 
instead of changes in recollection (e.g., Smeets, Telgen, Ost, Jelicic, & Merckelbach, 2009). 
These results are important because a debate exists as to whether certain suggestive 
techniques truly lead to false memory production. If not, the risk of false memory production 
may not be as high as is often assumed (e.g., Otgaar, Merckelbach, Jelicic, & Smeets, 2017). 
However, recent work has revealed that when methods such as the implantation are 
employed, suggestive pressure can lead to about 30% of individuals falsely remembering that 
they experienced an event (Scoboria et al., 2017). Such a high percentage is certainly 
alarming particularly when suggestion takes place in police interrogation settings. Moreover, 
evidence is accumulating that merely believing in an event is sufficient to motivate one to act 
on that belief, showing that belief (true or false) can have as much of an impact on behavior 
as (true or false) memory (see Otgaar, Moldoveanu, Wang, & Howe in press). This would 
imply that even when no recollection exists, a belief (false or not) about having been sexually 
abused might be enough for someone to file an official complaint to the police.  
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, we have delineated the main methods used to induce false memories in 
the laboratory. We have shown that many of these methods use some form of suggestion to 
promote false memories whereas others rely on the spontaneous generation of false memories 
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based on basic memory mechanisms such as spreading activation. We have shown that many 
of these methods were designed because of legal questions concerning the authenticity of 
eyewitness testimony and hence, these methods reflect real life situations including those 
pertinent to legal settings. Furthermore, both methods that elicit suggestion-induced or 
spontaneous false memories are of relevance in the legal arena because both can occur in a 
single particular case. That is, a young child can spontaneously come up with a statement of 
being abused after being suggestively interviewed by his/her mother about what ostensibly 
happened. Such examples are quite common in child sexual abuse cases, underscoring the 
importance of examining the different ways false memories can be produced. By doing so, 
researchers and forensic investigators become more cognizant of the importance of memory 
in court as well as the mechanisms that lead to the formation of false memories.  
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Table 1. Classification of different false memory methods 
 
Classification Specifics False Memory Methods 
 
 
Suggestion 
External suggestion Misinformation 
External suggestion Implantation 
External suggestion False feedback 
External suggestion Memory conformity/Social contagion 
External suggestion Crashing memory 
External suggestion Rumour mongering 
Autosuggestion Forced confabulation 
Imagination Imagination inflation 
 
Spontaneous 
 DRM 
Visual and Video Scenes 
 
 
